Place is first of all a (small) portion of the earth's surface identified by a name. The thing whose "place" is being specified is a "material object" or body. Simple analysis shows "place" also to be a group of material objects. Does the word "place" have a meaning independent of this one, or can one assign such a meaning to it? If one has to give a negative answer to this question, then one is led to the view that space (or place) is a sort of order of material objects and nothing else. If the concept of space is formed and limited in this fashion, then to speak of empty space has no meaning. And because the formation of concepts has always been ruled by instinctive striving for economy, one is led quite naturally to reject the concept of empty space.
It is also possible, however, to think in a different way. Into a certain box we can place a definite number of grains of rice or of cherries, etc. It is here a question of a property of the material object "box," which property must be considered "real" in the same sense as the box itself. One can call this property the "space" of the box. There may be other boxes which in this sense have an equally large "space." This concept "space" thus achieves a meaning which is freed from any connection with a particular material object. In this way by a natural extension of "box space" one can arrive at the concept of an independent (absolute) space, unlimited in extent, in which all material objects are contained. Then a material object not situated in space is simply inconceivable; on the other hand, in the framework of this concept formation it is quite conceivable that an empty space may exist.
These two concepts of space may be contrasted as follows: (a) space as positional quality of the world of material objects; (b) space as container of all material objects. In case (a), space without a material object is inconceivable. In case (b), a material object can only be conceived as existing in space; space then appears as a reality which in a certain sense is superior to the material world. Both space concepts are free creations of the human imagination, means devised for easier comprehension of our sense experience.
These schematic considerations concern the nature of space from the geometric and from the kinematic point of view, respectively. They are in a sense reconciled with each other by Descartes' introduction of the coordinate system, although this already presupposes the logically more daring space concept (b).
The concept of space was enriched and complicated by Galileo and Newton, in that space must be introduced as the independent cause of the inertial behavior of bodies if one wishes to give the classical principle of inertia (and therewith the classical law of motion) an exact meaning. To have realized this fully and clearly is in my opinion one of Newton's greatest achievements. In contrast with Leibniz and Huygens, it was clear to Newton that the space concept (a) was not sufficient to serve as the foundation for the inertia principle and the law of motion. He came to this decision even though he actively shared the uneasiness which was the cause of the opposition of the other two: space is not only introduced as an independent thing apart from material objects, but also is assigned an absolute role in the whole causal structure of the theory. This role is absolute in the sense that space (as an inertial system) acts on all material objects, while these do not in turn exert any reaction on space.
The fruitfulness of Newton's system silenced these scruples for several centuries. Space of type (b) was generally accepted by scientists in the precise form of the inertial system, encompassing time as well. Today one would say about that memorable discussion: Newton's decision was, in the contemporary state of science, the only possible one, and particularly the only fruitful one. But the subsequent development of the problems, proceeding in a roundabout way which no one then could possibly foresee, has shown that the resistance of Leibniz and Huygens, intuitively well founded but supported by inadequate arguments, was actually justified.It required a severe struggle to arrive at the concept of independent and absolute space, indispensable for the development of theory. It has required no less strenuous exertions subsequently to overcome this concept-a process which is probably by no means as yet completed.
Note: this text was written by Albert Einsten to the foreword of the book "Concepts of space : the history of theories of space in physics", Max Jammer, Oxford University Press, 1954
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